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Abstract
ABSTRACT : We examine the linkages between import policy and export
performance, extending classic macroeconomic trade effects to more recent
concepts from the modern literature on gravity models. We also examine
these effects empirically with a panel of global and bilateral trade spanning
15 years. Our emphasis on the role of import policy (i.e. tariffs) of exporters
as an explanation of trade volumes contrasts with the recent emphasis on im-
porter policy in the gravity literature. It also reinforces the growing body of
evidence on the importance of economic environmental (policy and infrastruc-
ture) conditions in explaining relative export performance.
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Protection and Performance
ABSTRACT : We examine the linkages between import policy and export perfor-
mance, extending classic macroeconomic trade effects to more recent concepts from
the modern literature on gravity models. We also examine these effects empiri-
cally with a panel of global and bilateral trade spanning 15 years. Our emphasis
on the role of import policy (i.e. tariffs) of exporters as an explanation of trade
volumes contrasts with the recent emphasis on importer policy in the gravity litera-
ture. It also reinforces the growing body of evidence on the importance of economic
environmental (policy and infrastructure) conditions in explaining relative export
performance.
Keywords: import policy and exports, Lerner symmetry, gravity model
JEL categories: F10, F15, O19,
1 Introduction
In a classic paper, Lerner (1936) demonstrated that under perfect competition, full
employment, balanced trade, and in the absence of transport costs the imposition
of import tariffs has the same effect as an export tax. The intuition behind Lerner’s
proposition is that higher protection shifts home demand towards home goods,
which makes less supply available for sale to export partners. The general equilib-
rium correspondence (or even an exact symmetric correspondence under appropriate
conditions) between import policy (i.e. tariffs) and export policy now stands as a
classic result of general equilibrium trade theory.1 Despite this correspondence, the
recent literature on policy and patterns of trade focuses on the policy of importers.
This is especially true in the now voluminous literature on the gravity equation. In
this literature, bilateral import protection affects trade directly, while the general
level of protection of individual countries also plays a role. Indeed, general levels of
1At the macroeconomic level this relationship has been well explored in the literature with
alternative assumption sets. McKinnon (1966) extended the Lerner symmetry theorem to the
three-commodity case with two import and one export good. The theorem was further extended
to non-tradables (McDougall 1970, Kaempfer, and Tower 1982, Canto et al 1992), to a three-sector
model with non-tradables (Milner 1995, Chen and Devereux 1994). Other extensions have involved
imperfect competition (Ray, 1975), bilateral tariffs (Gardner and Kimbrough, 1990), quantitative
restrictions (Lopez and Panagariya, 1995) and the role of the trade balance (Blanchard, 2009). At
the macroeconomic level, Lerner effects relate to the links between the real and financial sides of
the economy.
import protection in third countries can also deflect trade to alternative markets.
The critical point is the emphasis on policy in importing markets.
In contrast, in this paper we emphasize import protection by exporters. To
do this, we bridge both the concepts of multilateral resistance from recent gravity
literature to the macro concept of Lerner symmetry. Though largely ignored by the
recent literature, we show that the role of policy in exporting markets in explain-
ing general levels of trade should be comparable to policy in importing markets. In
particular, we extend the classical, analytical mapping of aggregate, macroeconomic
trade volume effects that follow from Lerner-type mechanisms to more recent con-
cepts from the empirical trade literature linked to bilateral gravity models of trade.
This is particularly relevant for the recent empirical literature on trade, policy, and
trade cost estimation as specified using this class of models. In doing this, we pro-
vide an analytical extension of the underlying theory on Lerner mechanics at the
level of aggregate trade volumes to include bilateral trade. We apply this framework
to a panel of global and bilateral trade data spanning over 15 years. Consistent with
the analytical results spelled out here, we find evidence at both the aggregate level,
and also at the bilateral level, that the import policies implemented by exporters are
a significant macroeconomic factor in explaining overall – and hence also bilateral –
export performance. These results reinforce the growing body of recent evidence on
the importance of economic environmental (policy and infrastructure) conditions in
developing countries in explaining their relative export performance.
We have organized the paper as follows. In Section 2 we expand the relevant
theory with extension to include both a dual representation of aggregate links be-
tween import and export values , and the linkage between aggregate Lerner effects
and bilateral trade flows. This builds on on the Anderson and Neary (1992) balance
of trade function. Section 3 provides our empirical analysis, highlighting the effects
of import policy on export performance both at aggregate and bilateral level. We
conclude in Section 4.
2 Import policy and exports
We start with a relatively general, duality-based representation of the aggregate
links between import and export values, mapping trade volumes based on the trade
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expenditure function of Neary and Schweinberger (1986). We also link import tar-
iffs in exporting markets analytically to exports in the context of modern gravity
model specifications which is closely linked to the concept of multilateral resistance
as developed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) to include the impact of import
policy on exports. This provides us with a set of estimating equations, both in
aggregate and for bilateral gravity modeling of trade, augmented to incorporate not
only standard gravity terms like trade policy in the destination market, but also ag-
gregate trade protection in the source or export markets as a source of ”multilateral
export resistance” through general equilibrium Lerner effects.
2.1 Aggregate Trade
Assume a single country, designated home, that can be characterized on the pro-
duction side by a standard expenditure function, and on the revenue side by a GDP
function. The usual assumptions are made about the numeric properties of the
expenditure and revenue functions (Dixit and Norman, 1980). With identical ho-
mothetic preferences defined over goods X, so that welfare can be specified in terms
of consumption of X as u = f(X), we have
e (u, P ) = min
X
{P ·X |f(X) ≥ u} (1)
In equation (1), u indexes final consumption (or identically national welfare), while
P denotes the vector of internal prices. The expenditure function defines the mini-
mum expenditure necessary, at prices P , to achieve national welfare u (or identically
it measures national income from the expenditure side). For production, the rev-
enue function defines the maximum value of national income given technology and
resource constraints (or identically national income from the value added side). Tak-
ing a as a particular sub-set of unit input coefficients from the set of all possible
unit input coefficients for endowments, we have
r = r(P, v) = max
X
{P ·X |a ·X ≤ v } (2)
In equation (2), r denotes the maximum value of national income achievable given
the vector of factor endowments v. The economy-wide condition for equilibrium
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requires that
Z = e− r (3)
where Z = 0 with balanced trade, and where under more general conditions it rep-
resents the value of the net trade balance. Starting from equation (3), known as
the trade expenditure function (Neary and Schweinberger, 1986), a general equilib-
rium expression for the full matrix of net imports (z) can then be defined by taking
derivatives of equation (4), which gives us the trade offer function 2:
ZP = eP − rP (4)
In the context of models with two traded goods, (or under more general models with
certain assumptions about two broad classes of goods), the offer function provides
a dual definition of the classic offer curve. In models with more than two goods,
it provides a definition of the n-dimensional offer surface defined over n-product
space. Evaluated for a given level of u, it provides compensated net import de-
mand. Evaluated in the context of the full general equilibrium system, it provides
Marshallian net import demand. We can bifurcate the right hand side of equation
(4) into gross imports and exports.
M = (eP− rP | p,∀ep − rp > 0) (5)
X = (rP− eP | p,∀ep − rp < 0) (6)
Using (5) and (6) we can then re-write equation (3):
Z = PM − PX = VM − V X (7)
Equation (7) links the value of exports V X to the value of imports VM and Z.
The relationship is quite general, though it involves both the value of exports and
imports and net financial inflows Z so that systematic log variation in import and
export values may or may not be directly proportional to each other. The closer
Z is to zero, the closer the relationship should be to direct proportionality. This
2We use the notation from (Dixit and Norman, 1980) in terms of expressing vectors and matrices
of partial derivatives
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relationship applies to the total value of imports and exports, and not to the un-
derlying quantities involved. Values and quantities can move in opposite directions
depending on price movements. In order to control for the role of the trade balance
when mapping imports to exports, we will re-write equation (7) as follows:
lnV X = lnVM − ζ (8)
In equation (8), the term ζ = ln(V X + Z) − ln(V X) allows for mapping of the
value of exports and imports, corrected for the trade balance. Recall from equation
(3) that Z is the current account deficit, or the mirror of the capital account. In
equation (8) the term ζ is another version of this deficit in logs, expressed as the log
ratio of import to export values. Balanced trade implies that ζ = 0. The term ζ will
allow for correction of the exporter capital account balance when we examine trade
flows econometrically. The impact of tariffs on aggregate exports follows directly
from our observation based on equation (7) about the linkage between aggregate
import and export values. When comparing countries with different tariff regimes,
as long as the value of imports is lower under higher import tariffs (i.e. Zp < 0 ),
we expect to see a lower value for aggregate exports as well 3.
2.2 Bilateral Trade
Although the literature on Lerner symmetry focuses on aggregate trade flows, it is
actually highly relevant for bilateral trade flows as well. Indeed, the recent empiri-
cal literature has taken advantage of the richness of bilateral trade data to explore
the determinants of trade flows, and the impact of policy and natural trade barri-
ers. Therefore, in this sub-section (and the next) we extend our framework along
bilateral lines.
We extend our basic theoretical framework above by introducing a CES-
based aggregator for imports. This requires that we start subscripting exporter and
importer countries. To avoid confusion, we will strictly use the following convention.
We will subscript trade, with the first index indicating source, and the second
indicating destination. So when country i is exporting, and its destination markets
are indexed by j, then in terms of direction of flows, mi,j means goods m flow i→ j.
3Here we do not model endogenous changes in the net capital balance ζ.
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We define a composite of total imports Mi of country i as following from a
representative CES aggregator for composite imports Mi.
Mi =
[∑
k
αkm
ρ
k,i
]1/ρ
1 > ρ > 0 (9)
In equation (9), the terms αk are the CES weights applied to imports indexed
by source country k. The (Allen) substitution elasticity across imports will be
σ = 1/(1 − ρ). Because we will be doing econometrics with trade data reflecting
actual prices and industrial structure (i.e. with variety given by actual values in
the cross-section), this specification is more general than it first appears. In par-
ticular, the CES weights can follow from both an Armington view of the world,
and also a variety-based view of the world with firm-level differentiation common
to the Ethier (1982), Krugman (1980), and Melitz (2003) versions of trade under
monopolistic competition.4 In the case of monopolistic competition, the α terms
index available varieties by source. This means the estimation strategy employed in
the recent gravity literature is consistent with the underlying theoretical structure
of monopolistic competition-based and Armington-based models of trade. Both can
be represented as in equation (9), though with a different interpretation of the CES
weights. From first order conditions for maximization of composite Mi subject to
expenditure on imports EM,i we can derive the following:
PM,i =
[∑
k
ασkω
1−σ
k,i
]1/(1−σ)
(10)
where ωk,i are the border prices for imports from different markets indexed over
k and flowing from k to i. Normalizing world prices (before any costs related to
distance or policy) to unity, we can specify border price as then being inclusive of
any distance-related cost factors γ:
ωk,i = γk,i (11)
PM,i =
[∑
k
ασkγ
1−σ
k,i
]1/(1−σ)
(12)
4See for example: Feenstra, Markusen and Zeile (1991) ; Feenstra (1994) ; Francois and Roland-
Holst (1997); Feenstra and Kee (2008); Francois and Woerz (2009).
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As a final step to moving across the border we will assume there are also policy
variables that raise the cost of imports, apart from any natural costs γ that follow
from physical constraints or cultural differences. For simplicity we assume here these
policy-linked costs are imposed at the border against all imports, raising the price
of delivered imports by the multiplier τi. Following de Melo and Robinson (1989)
we impose a specific functional form on the utility function underlying equation
(1) by introducing a second CES aggregator specified over imports and domestic
absorption D.5 This second, upper-nest CES function is as follows:
ui = Ai [βm,iM
ρ
i + βd,iD
ρ
i ]
1/ρ
1 > ρ > 0 (13)
Recall from our discussion of equation(1) that the term u is a measure of real
consumption (or real national income defined from the expenditure side). On the
demand side, imports are related to relative prices (the real exchange rate) and
total consumption. From our first order conditions for maximizing u at a given
level of total expenditure expenditure e, the value of total import demand VM can
be shown, after some manipulation to equal:
Vi
M = u
(
βm,i
τi
)σ
P 1−σM,i P
σ
u,i (14)
where Pu,i = ∂ei/∂ui is the CES-based composite price index for real consumption.
Note that (14) can also be derived form the envelope theorem, by first taking the first
derivative of the expenditure function with respect to PM,i. Normalizing quantities
(selectingAi so that Pu,i = 1, and making substitutions), we then have the following:
Vi
M = ui
(
βm,i
τi
)σ [∑
k
ασkγ
1−σ
k,i
]
(15)
This is a variation of the aggregate import demand function in de Melo and Robinson
(1989). Taking logs, we arrive at a global estimating equation for aggregate imports,
5This implies a CES-based expenditure function for (1). We keep the same substitution elastic-
ity. It adds to the complexity of the math, but not the basic result, to index tariffs across import
suppliers and nest the CES aggregators with different substitution elasticities.
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corresponding to a specific form of equation (4) above.
ln
(
Vi
M
)
= ln (ui) + σ ln (βm,i) + ln
(∑
k
ασkγ
1−σ
k,i
)
− στi (16)
Equation (16) defines the value of aggregate imports as a function of real consump-
tion and a mix of natural and policy-related trade costs. We can map this into
an estimating equation for the total value of exports by substitution through the
Anderson and Neary (1992) balance of trade function. Starting with equation (8),
and making a substitution into equation (16) we arrive at equation (17):
ln
(
Vi
X
)
= ln (ui) + σ ln (βm,i) + ln
(∑
k
ασkγ
1−σ
k,i
)
− στi − ζi (17)
Note that equation (17) points to the average tariff imposed in the market of the
exporter as a determinant of aggregate exports that will carry over to bilateral
export patterns. This is the mirror of the impact of general import protection
imposed by importers on aggregate and bilateral trade stressed in the gravity lit-
erature (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). On the import side, aggregate tariffs
are one determinant of what is referred to in the literature as multilateral resistance
to imports. Aggregate exports, in this form, are a function of real consumption
(GDP), natural trade barriers, and own tariffs in the exporter market. Turning to
the role of country i as an exporter selling across the border and into market j we
are also interested in the impact of its import policy on trade flow xi,j . Taking
equation (9) for a representative importer for a given set of world prices (recall we
are working from first order conditions under equilibrium conditions and so will
be assuming data represent equilibrium values in the cross-section), we can derive
bilateral exports from the first order conditions for constrained optimization of the
aggregate import equation (9).
xij = Vj
M
(
αi
τjγi,jPi
)σ
PMj
σ−1 (18)
In equation (18) the composite import price term is defined by equation (12). Also,
though we normalized export price Pi earlier for expositional purposes, we show
it again here for the sake of completeness. This is a relatively standard bilateral
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trade equation, specified in terms of the tariff of the importer τj . We want to map
the rate of protection in the export market τi to bilateral exports, adding it to
the estimating equation suggested by equation (18). We start by differentiating
exports with respect to the import tariff, and manipulating the resulting expression
to transform this into a function of the value of bilateral exports vxij and export
shares θij for the bilaetral flows that make up the value of total exports V
X
i from
country i. This is equation (19).
Vˆ Xi = −στˆi =
∑
j
θij vˆ
x
ij (19)
Adding to and subtracting Vˆ Xi from the right hand side gives us
Vˆ Xi = Vˆ
X
i +
∑
j
θij
(
vˆxij − Vˆ Xi
)
(20)
The last term in equation (19) is value-weighted deviations of individual changes
from the average deviation in export values (in particular deviations in the impact
of the tariff of the exporter given our aggregate import-export symmetry result
above). By definition this sum is zero, meaning the expected value of these individ-
ual deviations is also zero. With some further manipulation, this can be rewritten
as we have done in equation (20).
vˆxij = Vˆ
X
i −
∑
k 6=j
θ−1ij θik
(
vˆxik − Vˆ Xi
) (21)
Because the last set of terms in brackets, θik
(
vˆxik − Vˆ Xi
)
, has an expected value of
zero, we can write log deviations in the value of bilateral exports vˆxij in terms of the
change in total value exports due to the import tariff, which in turn is linked to the
tariff itself through the import price coefficient σ:
vˆxij |τˆ 6=0 = −στˆi + φ, E (φ) = 0 (22)
Equation (22) states formally that the aggregate impact of an import tariff on
bilateral exports can be captured by including the tariff as a right hand side variable.
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2.3 The Standard CES model
The Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) framework has emerged as a standard ref-
erence point in the modern gravity literature. As such, in this sub-section we will
map our general results to the specific structure of this class of models. Following
Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, we can also re-arrange the demand expressions
for a basic CES-based system to highlight the role of exporter protection. We first
generalize equation (9) to include domestic absorption when defining a composite
consumption good Q, inside a single CES nest.
Qi =
[∑
n
αng
ρ
n,i
]1/ρ
1 > ρ > 0 (23)
In equation (23), g denotes both domestic absorption and imports, and n includes
all countries (and so indexes domestic purchases as well as imports). We again
normalize prices to unity, and then define GDP as the quantity of the national good
Gi. This implies the supply constraint
Gi =
∑
n
gi,n (24)
From the properties of constrained optimization of consumption given equation (23),
treating GDP as the income constraint, we then have
gi,j = GjPQj
σ−1
(
αi
τjγi,j
)σ
(25)
where in equation (25) the term PQj denotes the CES price index for country j
associated with equation (23). Combining equations (24) and (25), we have the
following:
gi,j = Gi −
∑
n 6=j
gi,n = Gi −
∑
n 6=j
GnPQn
σ−1
(
αi
τnγi,n
)σ
(26)
Manipulation then yields the following:
gi,j = Gi
1− ∑
n 6=j,i
GnGi
−1PQn
σ−1
(
αi
τnγi,n
)σ
− PQiσ−1αiσ
 (27)
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If we substitute the functional specification of the CES price index in equation (27)
we have the following.
gi,j = Giαi
σ
αi−σ − ∑
n 6=j,i
GnGi
−1PQn
σ−1 (τnγi,n)
−σ −
∑
f
ασf (τiγf,i)
1−σ
−1

(28)
From equation (28), we can see that viewed from the supply side, bilateral exports
hinge on total available supply, third-country demand, but also the level of import
protection applied by the exporter. This is because, to close Lerner’s classic argu-
ment, higher protection shifts home demand towards home goods, which makes less
supply available for sale to export partners. This is reflected, in equation (28), in
the last term of the equation.6
3 Empirics
We next turn to an empirical analysis of the impact of import policy on export
performance both at aggregate level and bilateral trade level.7
3.1 Empirical methodology
3.1.1 Aggregate Trade
In the section that follows, we start with versions of equations (17), (19) and (22).
From equation (17), our estimating equation for total trade is defined below in
equation (29):
ln vxit = β0 + β1 ln(own τit) + β2 ln(world τit) + (29)
β3 ln(sizeit) + β4ζit + β5 ln(Wdistanceit) + Fi + Ft + εit
6technically in equation (28) we have also included the tariff applied to domestic absorption.
This can be cleaned up by imposing the condition γk,k = τ
−1
k .
7The recent empirical literature on the impact of tariffs on exports includes a mix of econo-
metrics and CGE models. Tokarick (2006) uses a CGE model to quantify the extent to which
import tariffs act as an export tax. Other papers have looked at the effects of import protection
on particular export sectors in particular countries. This includes Schiff and Valdes (1992), and
Manzur and Subramaniam (1995). More recently, in their empirical work on the role of the WTO
in promoting trade, Subramanian and Wei (2007) invoke own-liberalization in their econometric
model of the evolution of bilateral trade. Our use of selection modeling is a break from the general
approach followed in the literature.
11
Motivated by natural trade costs in equation (17), we have included the GDP-
weighted distance from the world Wdistance. To represent the size of the economy
(the term u in equation 17), we use both population and GDP. In addition to the
exporter’s import tariff, own τ , we also include third-country policy (another aspect
of the trade cost environment) as the trade-weighted average tariff faced in export
markets, represented by the variable world τ . The term ζ measures the role of the
current account balance from equation (8).8 Finally, we have also included exporter
and time fixed effects in the regressions. We regress equation (29) using OLS.
3.1.2 Bilateral Trade
In specifying the underlying structure of equation (30) for the bilateral regressions,
or identically the right hand side variables that make up vxi,j , we rely on equations
(19), and (22) (and also on equation (28)). There are many paths that lead to the
now standard functional relationship we use here. The first to propose a gravity
equation for trade flows as an empirical specification for trade without theory was
Tinbergen (1962). Anderson (1979) was the first to provide microfoundations based
on the Armington assumption. Among the more recent literature, Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003) elaborate on Anderson (1979) adding a practical way to estimate
the gravity equation structurally.9 A basic point of Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) is multilateral resistance. Not accounting for multilateral resistance terms
in a gravity model can lead to biased parameter estimates. This can be addressed
with country-level fixed effects, but one then loses scope for analysis of country-level
factors. To get around this, a recent strategy involves Taylor approximations of the
multilateral resistance terms to solve for the multilateral resistance terms (Baier
and Bergstrand, 2009). This allows for estimation of the gravity equation, inclusive
of country-level variables. In this paper we follow Baier and Bergstrand (2009)
extended to accommodate our Lerner variable and time variation in the data.
Following the gravity literature we expect trade flows to be a function of
8In particular, with some manipulation, one arrives at the term ζ = ln(V X + Z)− ln(V X). In
theory, the coefficient on this term should be negative. However, our trade data are for merchandise
only and we are missing export earnings linked to services exports. In addition, in official trade
data, the world runs a substantial trade deficit with itself. This means that while we expect ζ
to carry some explanatory power and have a negative sign, this will be limited by these effects,
implying a coefficient well below unity.
9Other important contributions to the gravity literature include Evenett and Keller (2002),
Deardorff (1988).
12
importer and exporter income, as well as of determinants of bilateral trade costs,
namely distance, tariffs, and whether countries speak the same language. Finally,
pulling all this together yields the following estimating equation.
ln vxi,j,t = α0 + α1 ln importerGDPj,t + α2 ln exporterGDPi,t + α3 ln distancei,j + (30)
α4commonlanguagei,j,t + α5 ln importerτi,j,t + α6 ln exporterτi,t + α7ζi,t + ui,j,t
Equation (37) assesses the determinants of the value of bilateral trade. vxi,j,t
is the value of country i exports to country j at time t. ln importerGDPj,t and
ln importerGDPj,t measure the market size of importers and exporters using GDP.
Distance is well established in the gravity equation literature. (See for example Di-
sidier and Head 2003, and Anderson and van Wincoop 2003.) The variable dummy
comlang ethno captures if the traders of the two trading partners can speak the
same language, or generally share the same linguistic heritage. For bilateral import
protection, we use applied tariffs, ln importerτi,j,t = ln (1 + τi,j,t), where τi,j,t indi-
cates the tariff applied against exporter i by importer j in period t. The variable
ln exporterτi,t measures the exporter country’s own average import tariff rate vis-
a-vis the rest of the world. The term ζ, as in the aggregate regressions, measures
the role of the current account balance from equation (8).
In order to include multilateral resistance terms, equation (37) is extended
following Baier and Bergstrand (2009). Indexing importers by (j, k, h), and ex-
porters by (i,m, z), equations (19) and (20) on page 80 of Baier and Bergstrand
(2009) are reproduced as equations (31) and (32) below.
Pit =
∑
m/∈i
lnTimt
GDPmt
GDPwt
− (0.5)
∑
h
∑
z
GDPht
GDPwt
GDPzt
GDPwt
lnThzt (31)
Pjt =
∑
j /∈j
lnTkjt
GDPkt
GDPwt
− (0.5)
∑
h
∑
z
GDPht
GDPwt
GDPzt
GDPwt
lnThzt (32)
Here, we have modified the basic Baier and Bergstrand specification to include time
indexing. In the case of bilateral tariffs lnTijt, we can specify multilateral resistance
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as in equation (33) below.
MRTijt = Pit+Pjt =
∑
m/∈i
lnTimt
GDPmt
GDPwt
+
∑
k/∈j
lnTkjt
GDPkt
GDPwt
−
∑
h
∑
z
GDPht
GDPwt
GDPmt
GDPzt
lnThzt
(33)
We can easily extend equation (33) to the more general case of bilateral time varying
variables Gijt as in equation (34) and importer and exporter multilateral resistance
term for the average tariff of exporters Texport:jt as in equation (35).
MRGijt =
∑
m/∈i
lnGimt
GDPmt
GDPwt
+
∑
k/∈j
lnGkjt
GDPkt
GDPwt
−
N∑
h=1
N∑
z=1
GDPht
GDPwt
GDPmt
GDPzt
lnGhzt
(34)
MRexport:ijt = lnIit
N∑
m/∈i
GDPmt
GDPwt
+
N∑
k/∈j
lnIkt
GDPkt
GDPwt
−
∑
h
∑
z
GDPht
GDPwt
GDPzt
GDPwt
lnIht
(35)
Our estimating equation augmented by the controls for multilateral resistance
for all the variables proxying for transport costs:
ln vxi,j,t = α0 + α1 ln importerGDPj,t + α2 ln exporterGDPi,t + α3 ln distancei,j + (37)
α4commonlanguagei,j,t + α5 ln importerτi,j,t + α6 ln exporterτi,t + α7ζi,t +
α8MR ln distancei,j,t + α9MRcommonlanguagei,j,t + α10MR ln importerτi,j,t
α11MR ln exporterτi,t + +ui,j,t
10 where MR ln distancei,j,t, MRcommonlanguagei,j,t, and MR ln importerτi,j,t
have been constructed following (34),MR ln exporterτi,t has been constructed fol-
lowing (35). Also, following Baier and Bergstrand (2009), we impose constraints
linking direct terms to MR terms in the estimating equation.11
In order to account for zero bilateral trade flows we employ a poisson estima-
tor.12 This implies that we do not take the log of the dependent variable in equation
10We also run the regression as a robustness check to smooth out imbalances with three years
moving averages. The results are almost identical to those presented here.
11α1 = 1, α2 = 1, α3 = α8, α4=α9, α5=α10, α6=α11.
12When examining the global pattern of bilateral trade flows, one striking feature of the land-
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(37). Santos and Tenreyro (2006) argue that gravity-type equations should be esti-
mated in their multiplicative form and propose to use a Poisson estimation. Using
this methodology is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and provides a
way to deal with zero values of the dependent variable.
3.2 Data
Our trade and tariff data spanning from 1988 to 2002 were obtained from the
UN/World Bank WITS database system (World Integrated Trade Solution). The
data in WITS come, primarily, from the UNCTAD TRAINS and COMTRADE
systems and the World Trade Organization’s integrated tariff database (IDB). The
data on GDP were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
Database. Geographic data, together with dummies for same language and colonial
links, are taken from Clair et al (2004).13 The distance data are calculated following
the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the relevant capital
cities. The countries included in the sample are listed in the annex.14
There are several country combinations for which trade data are not reported.
Following the recent literature, we assume that these missing observations from the
database represent zero trade. (See Baldwin and Harrigan 2007, Coe et al 2002,
Felbermayr and Kohler 2004.) However, we replace zero observations with missing
observations in case a country did not report trade with any other country in a given
year since in these cases the data are most probably missing from the database. We
use import data as it is likely to be more reliable than export data since imports
constitute a tax base and governments have an incentive to track import data.
Whenever import data were missing we used mirrored export data if those were
available (this represented only one-half of one percent of our observations).
scape is that many country pairs do not trade. See Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) and Baldwin
and Harrigan (2007). In our initial sample 42% of importer-exporter pairings had zero bilateral
trade (in our final sample including observations only when tariffs were available the share of
zeros was around 20% . Analyzing the determinants of trade flows without taking into account
potential trade which does not take place between country pairs may bias results. At a minimum,
unobserved trade may contain information about the factors driving bilateral trade relationships.
13http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
14While trade data are available for a wide range of country pairs, the available tariff data are
more limited. For this reason, we utilize a standard WITS procedure of matching the nearest
adjacent year to represent otherwise missing tariff data. Interpolation is then used for wider gaps.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Aggregate trade
Estimation results for the aggregate export flows are reported in Table 1 where the
dependent variable is export flows to the world. Results presented in Table 1 include
time and country fixed effects. To test the Lerner-effect the average import tariffs
of the exporting country were included in the regressions. Two different estimates
are presented in Table 1. The difference between the two specification is that the
first specification uses GDP of the exporter country as a proxy for the size of the
economy while the specification presented in column 2 includes population as a
proxy for size.
The results of both specifications indicate that the exporting country’s own
import tariffs have a negative effect on own exports. Thus based on our aggregate
regression results we cannot reject that the exporting country’s own import policy
influences its export performance. Trade costs, such as distance, measured as a
GDP weighted distance from the rest of the world, and the average import tariffs
which are applied on the country’s exports are both negatively influencing the value
of total exports. The variable measuring current account deficit is also negative and
significant as expected.
The second column presents results for a specification which uses population
as a proxy for size instead of GDP. We estimate this alternative specification as a
robustness check of the results presented in the first column as GDP of the exporting
country is correlated with distance and also tariffs. The sign and significance of the
variables do not change, however, the coefficient of distance and the tariff variables
becomes somewhat higher with this specification. 15 Based on these results, the
Lerner-effect cannot be rejected. Thus we find evidence that the exporting country’s
own import tariffs have a negative impact on its exports.
3.3.2 Bilateral trade
Next we turn to bilateral trade flows. The first column in Table 2 presents results
using poisson estimation including multilateral resistance terms and yearly fixed
15The difference in the coefficients between the two specifications is due to the correlation of
GDP of the exporting country with distance and tariffs.
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effects. The results of the bilateral regressions are similar to those found at the
aggregate level although the coefficients are somewhat different. Following Baier
and Bergstrand (2009) the coefficients of the exporter and importer country’s GDP
is constrained to be one. All the variables have the expected sign and significance.
The variable measuring the effects of current account deficit on exports and the
coefficient of distance is negative and significant. The coefficient of the exporter
country’s own import tariff is close to what we found at the aggregate regression
and also to the coefficient of the bilateral import tariffs. Both the bilateral tariff
elasticity and the exporter country’s own tariff coefficient is around -0.6. Thus these
results support the existence of the Lerner-symmetry also for bilateral trade flows.
3.3.3 Robustness
A potential endogeneity problem can be present in our bilateral regression. There
is a possibility of reverse causality in case bilateral exports would influence import
policy and thus bilateral import tariffs.16 To address this potential reverse causality
we restrict our sample to non-preferential trade flows. The bilateral tariffs applicable
in the case of non-preferential trade flows are the MFN (Most Favored Nation)
tariffs which are not determined by country-pair trade relations but set equally for
all partner countries thus reverse causality is unlikely. We also omit from the sample
imputed missing values as a further robustness check.
The results for this reduced sample are presented in the second column in
Table 2. This sample is smaller, includes only non-preferential trade. The results
are similar to those using the full sample with the coefficient on the exporter’s own
tariffs being a slightly lower (-0.408 instead of -0.582). Nevertheless our results hold.
Lerner effects are confirmed based on our results also at bilateral level.
4 Summary
In this paper we examine linkages between the trade policy (import protection)
of exporting countries and their export performance, both at the aggregate and
bilateral level. This involves analytical extension of the classic definition of ag-
16Reverse causality is unlikely to be a problem for the exporting country’s own import tariffs
as this variable is an aggregate tariff over all products and all import partners thus cannot be
influenced by sectoral lobbies or other factors influencing trade policy.
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gregate effects (linked to Lerner symmetry) to bilateral effects. This allows us to
use a bilateral gravity model. We test the importance of the exporting country’s
import policy for its own export performance (the ’Lerner-effect’ leading to export
resistance) both with aggregate and bilateral trade flows. This is based on the the-
oretical framework developed in the paper. We find at both the aggregate level,
and also at the bilateral level, that the trade policy of the exporting countries is
a significant factor in explaining export performance. Indeed, given approximate
symmetry as suggested by theory, the policy of exporters is as important, econo-
metrically, as policy in import or destination markets. This reinforces the recent
evidence on developing country’s export performance. General conditions of trade
openness in exporting markets matter empirically, for macroeconomic reasons, for
the performance by that same country in export markets both in aggregate and
bilaterally. This means that, when exploring multilateral or country specific deter-
minants of trade in a gravity context, trade polices in exporting markets deserve
place of importance next to trade polices in importing markets.
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Table 1: Lerner Effects at a Macro Level
ln Exports ln Exports
β1 : ln(own τit) -0.361* -0.515**
(0.210) (0.215)
β2 : ln(world τit) -2.957*** -3.239***
(0.415) (0.424)
β3 : ln(gdp) 0.896***
(0.0946)
β3 : ln(population) 0.499**
(0.222)
β4 : ζ -0.173*** -0.170***
(0.0198) (0.0202)
β5 : ln(Wdistanceit) -0.462*** -1.323***
(0.149) (0.146)
Constant -6.692*** -9.609***
(1.381) (1.379)
Observations 1095 1137
R2 0.912 0.581
F (Pr > 0) 5.95(0.00) 5.98(0.00)
Number of observations 1095 1137
Standard errors in parentheses
Specification includes time and country fixed effects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2: Poisson estimates for bilateral exports
Non-preferential trade
Full sample with non-imputed tariffs
α1 : ln importerGDPτj,t 1 1
(0.000) (0.000)
α2 : ln exporterGDPτi,t 1 1
(0.000) (0.000)
α3 : ln(distanceij) -0.609*** -0.500***
(0.0187) (0.0208)
α4 : ln(commonlanguageij) 1.041*** 0.717***
(0.0519) (0.0646)
α5 : ln importerτi,j,t -0.627*** -0.607***
(0.0398) (0.0479)
α6 : ln exporterτi,t -0.582*** -0.408***
(0.0740) (0.0435)
α7 : ζi,t -0.169*** -0.208***
(0.0144) (0.0187)
Constant 11.66*** 11.43***
(0.117) (0.136)
Observations 106,561 82,625
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Regressions include annual fixed effects and multilateral resistance terms for all trade cost variables.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Annex Table A.1: Sample countries
reporter & partner
Albania Guyana Nepal
Argentina Hong Kong, China New Zealand
Australia Honduras Oman
Austria Croatia Pakistan
Belgium Hungary Panama
Benin Indonesia Peru
Bangladesh India Philippines
Bulgaria Ireland Papua New Guinea
Bahamas, The Iran, Islamic Rep. Poland
Bolivia Iceland Portugal
Brazil Israel Paraguay
Barbados Italy Romania
Botswana Jamaica Russian Federation
Central African Republic Jordan Rwanda
Chile Japan Senegal
Cote d’Ivoire Kenya Singapore
Cameroon Korea, Rep. El Salvador
Congo, Rep. Kuwait Slovak Republic
Colombia Sri Lanka Slovenia
Costa Rica Lithuania South Africa
Cyprus Latvia Sweden
Czech Republic Luxembourg Syrian Arab Republic
Germany Morocco Chad
Dominican Republic Madagascar Togo
Algeria Mexico Thailand
Ecuador Mali Trinidad and Tobago
Egypt, Arab Rep. Malta Tunisia
Spain Mauritius Turkey
Estonia Malawi Tanzania
Finland Malaysia Uganda
Gabon Namibia Ukraine
Ghana Nicaragua Venezuela
Guatemala Norway Zambia
Zimbabwe
partner only
Fiji Sierra Leone United Arab Emirates
Haiti
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